the Journal he headed were marginalized. At this point the Soci6t6 de Psychologie adopted a new outlook.
Meyerson's ideas left no trace on this new kind of psychology, but the "new history"l--also called the "history of mentalities"--followed in Meyerson's footsteps (Brnner, 1996; Chartier, 1983 Chartier, , 1996 Revel, 1996b) .
Meyerson Comes to Pads: General Setting Before WWI Meyerson arrived in Paris at the age of 18 in 1906. He had studied chemistry for 6 months at Heidelberg University after escaping from Warsaw, where he had participated in an insurrection against the czar in 1905. This remarkable young man had known since the age of 14 that he would become a psychologist. 2
In Paris, Meyerson was provided with accommodations by his uncle, ISmile Meyerson, who had been a professor of physics before turning to the study of philosophy and was preparing to publish an epistemological work of great importance entitled Identitd et Rdalit~ (Identity and Reality, E. Meyerson, 1908) . Emile advised his nephew to begin his education with science, and in 1907 Ignace Meyerson enrolled in a school of medicine and natural sciences, where he attended Louis Lapicque's course.
For the next few years, Meyerson studied under the finest French scientists, historians, and philosophers with the most innovative ideas of the time. These independent spirits also taught him a certain political way of thinking that deeply marked his understanding of psychology, just as it had marked their views of science, history, and mankind. Meyerson was rapidly introduced into the circle of Dreyfus supporters (the "Dreyfusards"), who were the defenders of the Jewish army officer Capt. Dreyfus, who had been wrongly accused of treason. At the turn of the century France was divided into two camps, those for and those against Dreyfus, and intellectual circles were particularly affected by this division (Charles, 1990; Smith, 1997) .
Meyerson worked with Lapicque at the laboratory of the Museum d'Histoire Naturelle (Museum of Natural History). Lapicque was a professor of experimental physiology at the Facult6 des Sciences (Sciences Faculty) of Paris. Starting in 1911, he taught that subject at the museum, and in 1912 he was appointed director of the experimental physiology laboratory at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE-School of Higher Studies; Charles & Telk~s, 1989) . Lapicque had been one of the founders of the HRL in 1898 and had organized the first public meeting of the group, known as the "Crossacks," on the Rue Monge in Paris, to defend Capt. Dreyfus in response to the antisemitic charges against him.
Through Lapicque, Meyerson met Henri Laugier, also a political militant. At that time Laugier was working at the Laboratoire de Psychophysiologie du Travail (Laboratory of Psychophysiology of Labor) at the Marey Institute, and he later became chief of research at the Laboratorie de Physiologie G6n6rale (Laboratory of General Physiology) at the Facult6 des Sciences. When the Radical Party took 1H. Berr, founder of the Revue de Synth~se Historique (Review of Historical Synthesis) , was the first in 1919 to use the expression in French (Berr, 1919) ; however, E. W. Dow had already used it in 1898 in an article published in American Historical Review (see Dow, 1898) .
2personal communication from C. Bresson, Meyerson's wife (July 2, 1998) . See also the short biography written by Bresson (1991; Di Donato, 1995; Poulat, 1994 Poulat, , 1996 Vernant, 1996 Lapicque's invitation of Meyerson to Arcouest (a seaside biology laboratory in Brittany) during the summer of 1911 marked Meyerson's life, because it was there he encountered the historian Charles Seignobos, also a member of the HRL. Seignobos came to regard Meyerson as his adopted son, bringing him warmth and comfort and especially providing "the greatest intellectual joys ''6 to this rather lonely and still quite shy foreign student. Seignobos was then a "bugbear" of young historians because they saw in him a relentless opponent of what he called "the history of philosophy ''7 (so as not to mention sociology) and because he placed priority not on social history but rather on political history. The reproaches of Seignobos's positivism were to be repeated, sometimes unfairly, by the founders of the Annales (Prost, 1994; Revel, 1996a, pp. 168-170) . Despite this antagonism, Seignobos and Franqois Simiand, like Lton Blum, were on the editorial committee of the socialist journal La Semaine (The Week), launched by Lucien Herr (Andler, 1977, pp. 165-166) .
Also through Lapicque, Meyerson was introduced to Victor Basch, who became president of the HRL in 1926 and had been one of the first, along with Ltvy-Bruhl and Durkheim, to be convinced of Dreyfus's innocence. Meyerson also met Lucien Herr, who was highly influential in the development of human 3This association was founded by academics who had been mobilized during WWI and had been moved by the solidarity they saw among the troops, the illiteracy of some, and the high command's deficiencies. After the war, they founded the Compagnons (the name was chosen to evoke the Middle Ages) to propose educational reforms and especially a unified schooling for all until the age of 14.
4The conservatoire had several laboratories dedicated to the scientific study of work. 5For more on Laugier, see Schneider (1989) and Laugier (1972) . 6Letter to Seignobos from I. Meyerson, September 13, 1934 (Charmasson, Demellier, Parot, & Verm~s, 1995 . However, the cost of his attachment and fidelity to Seignobos, despite their profound differences, was Braudel's indifference at a time when Meyerson badly needed historians after WWII.
7See Langlois and Seignobos (1898/1992) .
sciences. Herr was the librarian of the I~cole Normale Suprrieure on the Rue d'Ulm, had been a member of the HRL, and was the leading thinker for several generations of students at the Ecole Normale (Biard, Bourel, & Brian, 1997 We must bless the Dreyfus case that in a way revealed to us our real nature, and gave to many of us, who are too exclusive or sectarian in their comprehension of social life, a larger sense of humanity, a more noble and eager desire for justice. The history of the Socirt6 de Psychologie is illustrative of the general evolution of the discipline in the 20th century. In April 1901, its foundation was announced in the Bulletin de l'Institut Psychologique International (published by Alcan). The institute itself was established on June 30, 1900, under the auspices of Pierre Janet, l° to study phenomena that today fall outside the realm of the sciences, such as telepathy and materialization, which are said to be psychic or paranormal.
8On Bougl6 and antiracism in the Durkheim circle, see Mucchielli (1997b) . 9For further details, see Verm~s (1996) . 10Concerning the role of Janet in French psychology, see Brooks (1993) .
On the International Organization Council of the institute one could find the greatest names in French science and philosophy, along with foreign correspondents, all wishing to understand certain unexplained phenomena: A. Paris) . 11 The finest thinkers and scientists of the time, from Henri Bergson to Marie Curie, went there to experiment with so-called mediums or psychics, in order to test a hypothesis considered scientific at the time: that mind, like matter (x-rays had just been discovered, among other things), produces intangible rays that allow individual minds to communicate with each other, even after death. 12 Since the establishment in London in 1882 of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR), 13 most psychologists in the world, in the company of physicists and physicians, had been examining the hypothesis of the power of the mind at a distance, especially telepathy. In 1889 the SPR launched an extensive census of telepathy and hallucination, and the first International Psychology Congress, which took place in Paris in the same year, largely echoed the census results. Following the fourth international congress, which again took place in Paris, the decision to create the Parisian Institute was reached. 14 As noted above, the Bulletin announced in 1901 the foundation of the Socitt6 de Psychologie, which was to hold monthly meetings on the premises of the institute and would publish its reports in the Bulletin. The socitt6 consisted of 40 tenured members representing different disciplines of psychology and several honorary members. Georges Dumas (1901) 15 signed the report of the first session. The odor of scandal quickly surrounded the institute's work, and no results that validated the hypothesis of the mind's power at a distance were obtained. After publishing its reports for 5 years in the Bulletin and holding its monthly meetings in the offices of the institute, the Socitt6 de Psychologie cautiously withdrew from the scene of spiritism.
At the same time, in 1904, Janet and Dumas created the Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, which at first accepted numerous reports, many of which concerned paranormal phenomena. The first issue did not contain anything about the founding of the journal or any special announcement; neither liThe first general assembly of the HRL was held there on June 4, 1899. 12No matter how strange it might seem today, this question had captured the attention of scientists in many countries. For more details about that period, see Parot (1994) .
~3See Oppenheim (1985) . 14See Parot (1994) . tSDumas was an influential professor of experimental psychology at the Facult6 des Lettres of Pads, then professor of pathological psychology from 1921; see Brooks (1993) . did any of the 1905 issues. In 1906 a column called "Communications of the Socirt6 de Psychologie" was introduced, with this announcement on p. 327:
The Socirt6 de Psychologie held its first monthly session on Friday June 1 st at the Quinet Amphitheater of the Sorbonne. The following were present: Messieurs Arnaud, Branly, Dumas, Janet, Pirron, Srglas, Sollier, Rabaud, Simon, Kahn, Charpentier, Meunier, etc., etc.
The section dedicated to the socirt6 ended with: "M. Srglas (President) requests the reading by Dumas of the statutes of the Socirt6 for Experimental and Comparative [italics added] Psychology, which was unanimously approved." This name was the title ofT. Ribot's chair at the Coll~ge de France; the socirt6 probably chose it to emphasize its scientific nature. Thus, with a more precise qualification, the socirt6 changed its name; soon, however, it was referred to again as the "Socirt6 de Psychologie. been before the war: a place of genuine, in-depth debate with the other human sciences (see, e.g., Mucchielli, 1994, pp. 458-459) . Before the war, in its first few years of publication, the Journal had reserved a small bibliography colunm for debates among sociologists and historians. But Janet and Dumas wanted to lead 16For further details, see Parot (in press ). 17Henri Wallon, doctor of medicine and philosophy, was a Dreyfus supporter and socialist; later he became a professor of psychology and child education at the Coll~ge de France and a member of the Communist Party after WWII.
~SJean Nageotte had been a professor of comparative histology at the Coll~ge de France since 1912 (Charles & Telk~s, 1988, pp. 191-192) .
19Quoted by Di Donato (1996, pp. 120-121) .
psychology to independence, not open it up to the other social sciences; Janet sought this goal more than Dumas who, in 1924, became a member of the Sociology Institute created by the Durkheimians (Heilbron, 1983 21A student of Bergson, Delacroix was a professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne; Meyerson had attended his course before the war and sometimes even taught in his place.
22The board of this journal also included Lron Blum and Lucien Herr. 23Lalo was a philosopher of aesthetics, Rivet was an ethnologist, Luquet was a psychologist who studied children's drawings, Rey was a historian of sciences, and Lahy was a psychophysiologist of labor.
view" (Meillet, 1904 (Meillet, -1905 . Several years later, G. H. Mead also criticized Wundt's conception of the origin of languages, presenting arguments close to those set forth by Meillet (Mead, 1909; see Nerlich & Clarke, 1998) .
Meillet was fundamentally Durkheimian, and therefore he also sought unity among the human sciences (Meillet, 1903 (Meillet, -1904 . To establish this union, Meyerson asked him to run for the presidency of the Socirt6 de Psychologie. In accepting this position, Meillet was far from admitting that the union between psychology and linguistics had already been established: "To bring psychologists and linguists closer to each other is not an easy job. They do not even share a common vocabulary" (1923, p. 480) . However, the borders had to be crossed. This president was to publish numerous articles and analyses in Meyerson' Like Meillet, of whom he was a close friend for many years, Mauss 25 had already declared in 1923 that he was not an expert in psychology but, with his usual irony, he hypothesized that there might be "a certain psychological tactic of the Socirt6 to appropriate as president a linguist, then a biologist, and now another foreigner to this science" (Mauss, 1923, p. 756 ). Mauss declared his ambition to examine "man as a whole," not cut up into disciplinary slices: "a man who lives in body and soul, in a determined point in space and time, in a specific society" (1923, p. 757) . He acknowledged that psychology had indeed progressed, but mostly in certain fields, such as psychophysiology. Yet attention had to be paid to the psychological wholeness of the individual, that is, to the body and to the individual's consciousness, as well as to what his uncle Durkheim and the sociology school had called collective consciousness. In his presidential speech Mauss expressed the requests that sociology wished to make of psychology concerning the study of collective representations. The psychologist must explain how such representations evolve, on an individual basis, into ideas and motives, while describing the practices and social behaviors to which they correspond. Sociologists and psychologists were competing, each group claiming the field to be its own; but sociologists were unaware of their limits: "We are so close to physiology, that is, to the phenomena of the body's life, that between them and 24Verneau, cited by Mucchielli (1998, p. 488) . 25Regarding Mauss, see Fournier (1994) . social issues, it seems that the layer of individual consciousness is very thin" (Mauss, 1924, p. 899) .
Caught between physiology and a "psychological" sociology, psychology's purpose was strictly to study the individual consciousness, reduced to the very small portion that Mauss left for it, with some a regret "because whatever the community's power of suggestion is, it always leaves the individual with a sanctuary, his consciousness, which belongs to you" (Mauss, 1924, p. 899) . To contribute to the progress of human science, psychology must not waste its attention on one mental function or another; it had to focus on the individual's mentality as a whole. Mauss insisted that there was nothing to expect from the atomization of human reality, because every man is a "whole," and by cutting him up one loses what is human in him. Man divided into faculties does not exist; a unified human science has to be concemed with "facts of a complex nature, of great complexity" (Mauss, 1924, p. 912) . Already in 1913, in a note coauthored with Durkheim, Mauss had said that one of the aims of sociology was holistic: the description of civilization, a complex system that unifies different social issues (Durkheim & Manss, 1913 boldness in stating already that whatever progress is made in psychophysiology will only represent a fraction of psychology, because most mental phenomena do not derive from organic causes" (quoted by Mucchielli, 1994, p. 453 ). Mauss answered Pirron in a cautious and restrained manner: Granted, psychologists should not be reproached for not having considered man as a whole, but they were still in the infancy of their art. However, they had to be asked to complete their research, which remained unfinished. Psychologique (1924, pp. 381-384) . He sharply asserted that psychology had already focused enough on the wholeness of man, that sociology was part of psychology, 26 and (with irony) that Mauss was just a psychologist. He continued that we must distance ourselves from psychology in order to acknowledge its contribution, stand back to become more and more distant from psychological facts, in order to be able in the end to consider them as objects and use an objective psychological approach. At the same time, Meyerson expressed his fundamental 26This is something with which Mauss agreed, as he had stated in a 1901 article, at a time when the relationship between the two disciplines was already an important subject of debate (Manss & Fauconnet, 1901). conviction, which was to be the driving force of his work until the end, and which was to obtain Mauss's agreement: "The object of our choice is the history of the development of the mind: When it is examined within children, or throughout the changing of institutions, we are doing history" (I. Meyerson, 1924, p. 383) . Thus Meyerson's psychology emerged: developmental, objective, historical. The work of symbolic thinking, 27 which is the very core of this psychology, is human work, the work of the whole man of whom Mauss dreamed. Meyerson's (1924, p. 301) psychology was "offered to M. Mauss as a testimony of affectionate loyalty. It will be our 1925 potlatch. ''28 In those years, another man claimed the same convictions as Meyerson. Charles Blondel was a philosopher as well as a physician. He taught in Strasbourg at the same time as his friend Febvre, who, in 1929, was to launch Les Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale along with Bloch. Blondel was the first to take a very clear position on the question of the historicity of the mind, even before the historians' ideas took shape. Basing his ideas on careful consideration of "morbid mentality" and on his readings of Lrvy-Bruhl, he believed that, just like the mental life of the "primitives," the life of the mentally ill differs from that of others. In 1910, in an article in the Journal de Psychologie devoted to primitive mentality, he described the mental conversion that psychology had to make:
In 1924 Meyerson analyzed Mauss's great 1924 report in Pirron's L'Ann~e
We only had eyes for the machine; seeing it producing what we called thoughts, we imagined it to be our own and even within us; instead, it was really only put inside us by society in order to make use of the raw materials from our individual consciousnesses. (Blondel, 1910, p. 541) The issue of the historicity of the human mind could be approached, according to Meyerson and Blondel, only within the context of the changes that were affecting the study of history in France since WWI. These changes also were a testimony of the desire to achieve a synthesis of human sciences, a synthesis that had already been sought by Bert himself. In 1910 Berr had created the Revue de Synth~se Historique, which Febvre later called the "Trojan horse" of the young historians who were breaking away. Actually, he had given the review a rather psychological-sounding program: "to build the entire history of the mind and human action" (Berr, 1964, p. 104) . In 1925, 4 years before the creation of the Annales, Berr founded the Centre International de Synth~se (International Center of Synthesis) which, starting in 1929, organized Synthesis Weeks for historians, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers. Bert's plan 29 was to fight against disciplinary divisions, and specialization of analysis, and for the synthesis of methods, problems, and the results of the human and natural sciences (hence the importance of Langevin's presence, and in particular that of physicists). Febvre and Bloch actively participated in the synthesis enterprise. Yet differences were to 27Symbolic thinking was also a main concern of Jean Piaget, a man whom Meyerson had recently met and who was to remain his friend; regarding the friendship between Meyerson and Piaget, see Vidal and Parot (1996) .
28During the 1923-1924 academic year, in his course at the EPHE, Mauss mentioned the potlatches described earlier by Malinowki in his work on the Trobriandes (while he was preparing his famous Essai sur le don, 1925) .
29The Centre International de Synth~se recently published the proceedings of a conference devoted to Bert's work that took place in Paris in 1944 (Biard et al., 1997) .
come to light, in particular Febvre's insistence on historical problems rather than dissolving history into Berr's general synthesis (Mucchielli, 1997a; MUller, 1997) .
Efforts to reject any fixist conception of social and mental phenomena were thus combined. This is precisely when the important concept of mentality was developed by the new historians to call sociologists and psychologists to work with them. Against purely descriptive history--that positivist history that considered the historical and, above all, political facts to be at the heart of the discipline--the historians of the Annales promoted the long-term history of civilization and collective imagination. 3° History had to take an interest in the structure of thought as a set of economic, social, political, and religious characteristics of the spirit of the times, the Zeitgeist, which Febvre called in 1942 in his Rabelais the "outillage mental" (mental tools). To study the evolution of these mental tools and Durkheimian collective representations, it was necessary to create a "historical psychology" that would describe the complex relations between these collective and individual representations and their impact on psychological functions such as perception and memory.
Meyerson's Socirt6 de Psychologie and Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique opened their doors to these issues at the heart of the human sciences. In the Journal's columns as well as at the various conferences we find the contributions of historians such as Seignobos, of course, but also L. Alphandrry; and folklore historians such as A. During these years, Meyerson was opening up psychology to a great number of approaches to form a unified science of man as a whole. To do so, he surrounded himself with colleagues belonging to the Durkheimian, socialist, and Dreyfusian circles. Although Meyerson did not appear prominently as an author in the Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, he was nonetheless its guiding spirit. In the same way, he directed the evolution of the Socirt6 de Psychologie, soliciting participation, discussing tirelessly with authors and lecturers; his correspondence attests to this personal involvement and devotion. 32 Furthermore, Meyerson did not have any heavy teaching or administrative responsibilities between the two world wars; he devoted his work days and holidays (for instance, with Piaget or Legendre) to the Journal and to the socirt4. As a consequence, Meyerson did not write a book, except his thesis, Les fonctions psychologiques et les oeuvres (Psychological Functions and Works) , which was published in 1948. There he 3°For more details, see Burke (1990) and Iggers (1985) . 31Arnold van Gennep was an original figure in French ethnology: Because he majored in folklore, a category that was not well regarded at French universities, he did not obtain any institutional support; in 1943 he wrote a great and irreplaceable book, Manuel du Folklore Frangais Contemporain (van Gennep, 1943 (van Gennep, /1998 , the first volume of which---some 1,200 pages--was reprinted recently in France; he also founded the Revue des Etudes Ethnographiques et Sociologiques in 1907.
32See Charmasson et al. (1995) .
presented sketchily 33 some of his conceptions of what psychology had to be; it was a programmatic text, not a presentation of psychological observations or experiments. Later, when Meyerson taught psychology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (School of Higher Studies in Social Sciences), he presented (for instance, in 1975-1976) his historical psychology of perception, memory, language, experience, and other psychological functions (see Parot, 2000) . But he was then very old and had been forgotten by psychologists.
Meyerson was forced by events to turn away from his programmatic preoccupations. In 1933, when the Nazis took over in Germany, Meyerson and Genevirve Bianquis were already helping German graduate students to emigrate. In April 1927, Meyerson, as general secretary of the Socirt6 de Psychologie, had apprised the members of the "situation of the German intellectuals in exile among whom there are a few psychologists and philosophers" (Meyerson, 1934, p. 200) . This was to be the only contribution on the issue from the Socirt6 de Psychologie. However, in the company of Paul Fauconnet, Marcel Granet, Maurice Halbwachs, Lrvy-Bruhl, Bloch, and Mauss, Meyerson signed in 1938 a call against fascism, along with 8 professors from the University of Pads.34
After the Nazi invasion in 1940, Meyerson was forced to leave Pads and take refuge in unoccupied France, in Toulouse. During his absence, the socirt6 and the Journal, under Paul Guillaume's 35 supervision, somehow continued their activities, while Meyerson went underground and joined the French Resistance. In 1941 the socirt6 became the Socirt6 Fran~aise de Psychologie, but the meetings were held only occasionally. Whereas WWI had decimated a large part of the young supporters of Dreyfus (Mucchielli, 1998, pp. 522-523) , during WWII a number of Meyerson's friends died: Bloch was tortured and shot in 1944; Halbwachs was deported and died at Buchenwald in 1945; Granet passed away suddenly in 1940 after an interview with a member of the Vichy government; and Mauss, faced by such a disaster, plunged into a deep illness and oblivion.
After WWII Meyerson did not succeed in maintaining the Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique for long as the official organ of the Socirt6 Fran~aise de Psychologie. French psychology now had a new outlook, a more behavioristic tendency, joining "its fate with that of natural science" (Bruner, 1996, p. 193) . The influence of behaviorism on French human sciences after the war may be, at first sight, explained by the will to make these "literary" disciplines more factual and positivistic. This will was acknowledged by the men who, like Pirron, participated in the construction of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS; National Center for Scientific Research) and who managed to include psychology in the group of the "sciences of life" (not in the "sciences of man"). But, more deeply perhaps, the way was opened to behaviorism by a more ideological, philosophical (more or less unconscious) aim to isolate the individual from the collectivity; these men, with Pirron, wanted to construct a science of man 33Because he had to finish his thesis to become professor at the Sorbonne, where he replaced Guillaume, Daniel Lagache was chosen instead and became professor of psychology.
34See Foumier (1994, p. 686 (Parot, 2000) . apart from cultural determinants. That science would be a true science, a pure one. 36
The historical context of behavior--its cultural meaning and its long-term evolution--gradually disappeared from psychology in France, because these dimensions seemed less objective than behavior observed in a laboratory. In 1956
Paul Fraisse, Pi6ron's student, founded the journal Psychologie Franfaise (French Psychology) to reflect what the Soci6t6 Franqaise de Psychologie would be from then on: a forum for positivistic research conducted in a laboratory. Even sociology was subjected to this American influence, and "social psychology," which was supposed to bring together the two disciplines, took a behavioristic perspective far from Mauss's highly valued wholeness of man. So Meyerson and his historical psychology were first marginalized 37 and then slowly forgotten. However, historians preserved the legacy. In 1950 it was Febvre who invited Meyerson to return to Paris as a research director in the sixth section of the EPHE founded in 1946 by Febvre and Fernand Braudel. Their successors were later to recognize their indebtedness to Meyerson's work (Chartier, 1983 (Chartier, , 1996 Revel, 1996b was a characteristic feature of mankind, one that could not be considered an individual attribute because it reflected the structures of society and how they were produced collectively. Meyerson believed (like Norbert Elias, whom he did not read) that the structures of human internality, of society, and of history are indissociable, interdependent phenomena. As Elias (1939) stated, and as Meyerson expressed differently at the conference on the Probl~mes de la Personne (Problems of the Person) held in 1960 (published in 1973) , any separation between the individual and the community contributes to creating a fictitious being: an inner man to whom we lend a natural and biological origin, rendered autonomous of his social bases. On the contrary, said Meyerson, the person was built through history.
According to Meyerson, the mind could not be regarded by psychologists as being in the subject but was rather outside the subject: His psychology was therefore not subjective but objective. The mind shows its objective presence in productions, in pieces of work and in traces that must be examined by psychologists. In a striking way, this conviction corresponds not only to the ideas of Wilhem Dilthey but also to the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles S. Peirce, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and, later, to Charles Taylor's work (1989) . 38 Psychologists must analyze the phenomena that expressed the psychological functions involved in the objectivization of the mind (religions, dreams, monuments, techniques, works of art, etc.). In Meyerson's view, this world of works is to psychologists what natural facts are to physicists. Mental states thus become 36One can compare this appeal for "scientific" psychology with the project of Lashley and others in America from 1920; see Weidman (1999) . 37Regarding this exclusion, see Parot (2000) . 38Regarding these relationships, see Descombes (1998) .
objects, which can be studied objectively. 39 Meyerson firmly set aside the substantialistic conceptions of the mind, according to which there is a transcendent and ahistorical ego behind human creations; the mind and the ego are not substances in which activities develop: They are those activities.
Meyerson stated that these works change with the civilization and the historical context, following the lessons he had received from his sociologist and historian friends. Because these phenomena reflected the mind, one had to admit that, with historical conditions, the human mind itself--that is, the operations and functions it applies to produce its works--also varies. One had to abandon the idea of the invariability of the mind, to which its naturalization necessarily leads, and admit the historicity of mental categories. 4° Historical psychology had to acquire a conceptual means for understanding men who think differently, who use another "mental tool": It also had to be comparative.
This point in Meyerson's reasoning is where the fundamental differences from historians of mentalities lie. Its "perpetual moderness" (Chartier, 1996, p. 233) resides in its refusal of any simplification: An objective, historical, and comparative psychology had to refuse to convey the idea of any inherent coherence among the different types of works and thus among the different functions that exist simultaneously in a civilization. The concept of "mentality" was too inclusive; it "leads to generalization that is likely to darken simultaneous diversity and real successive variations" (I. Meyerson, 1948 Meyerson, /1995 . Meyerson doubted the existence of a formal invariant of civilization, an "atom of civilization"; he sought complementarity, links, and discrepancies. A historical series had to be written for each type of works and each function. Historical psychology was viewed as a polyphony (I. Meyerson, 1987, p. 54) .
The social and political convictions he acquired in his youth marked Meyerson's psychology. Like Durkheimian sociology, and like the HRL since its founding, Meyerson's conception of psychology was built on a constant tension between the individual and the collective. On the basis of the conviction that individual freedom depends on universal freedom, proclaiming on June 4, 1898, that its legitimacy was rooted in the judicial error made against Dreyfus, the HRL extended its ethical ambition by defending the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which transcended individual cases. Durkheim's sociology addressed this tension between the two poles, intending to interrelate the individual and collective representations. Psychologists were needed, and Meyerson filled this need. All of his work was devoted to the difficult task of proving that a psychological function supported by biological structures, obviously both individual and universal, could be expressed in accordance with collective settings that constitute the existence of the individual mind.
Meyerson's work, which we must now retrieve from its forgotten state and its incompleteness, implores psychologists to consider the relationships between the consciousness of such and such a person, and the consciousness or shared 39"Mental states do not remain as states; they are cast, they take shape, they tend to solidify, to become objects" (I. Meyerson, 1948 Meyerson, /1995 .
4°On this issue Chattier (1996, p. 232) underlined the relationships between Meyerson's and Michel Foucault's thinking: "Risking anachronism, which is a mortal sin according to the doctrine of the Annales, I will assume this time, we can only be sensitive to the closeness of Meyerson's affirmations and the foundations of Elias's or Foucault's work." intersubjective meanings of a social group (e.g., similar tastes among the members of society at a given time), what Taylor (1985, p. 36) called "common meanings" that must be searched for in social relations or, as Mauss stressed, in social practices. These common meanings that exist outside the subject are constantly rea_ffu'med by society, instilled and cultivated, by a will that is not individual. They are the social rules that Mauss was talking about in 1936 when he said that the correct way for an English woman to walk was different from that for a French woman (Mauss, 1936 (Mauss, , 1997 . Mauss finished his comments on the "techniques of the body" by asserting that "habitus vary not only between individuals, but most of all according to societies, educations, conveniences, modes, prestige" (1936, 1997, p. 369 ). Yet these habitus are not as explicit, passed verbally by one individual to another; they are the realm of customs and "common meanings." Historical psychology is the science of morals; in other words, it is a moral science. It is not a natural science, but it is able to get rid of "anthropocentric properties," as Taylor (1985) noted. To enter a human being, according to I. Meyerson (1987) , is to act within a space of values, of rule-based customs; the isolated, uncommitted subject is a fiction. After WWII there was no psychology in France to undertake this vast program. Experimental psychology isolated man from the world and took away that which is specific to him: his "cultural nature."
